

before the uncertain future, which may depend upon a party vote in the distant House of Commons.

There can be no doubt that Cyprus or Crete was requisite to England as the missing link in the chain of our communications with Egypt. As a strategical point, Cyprus must be represented by Famagousta, without which it would be useless for the ostensible purpose of its occupation. Many persons of great practical experience would have preferred Crete, as already possessing a safe harbour in Suda Bay, with a climate superior to that of Cyprus, while according to our assumed defensive alliance with Turkey in the event of a renewed attack by Russia, we should have acquired the advantage of Cyprus whenever required, without the expense or responsibility, and we should in addition have established a station on the coast of Asia Minor at the secure harbour afforded by the Gulf of Ayas at Alexandretta.

These geographical questions are a matter of opinion, but now that we actually have occupied Cyprus it is absolutely necessary to do something. Without Famagousta, the island would be worthless as a naval station; with it, as a first-class harbour and arsenal, we should dominate the eastern portion of the Mediterranean, entirely command the approach to Egypt, and keep open our communications with the Suez Canal and the consequent route to India. In the event of the Euphrates valley line of railway becoming an accomplished fact, Cyprus will occupy the most commanding position. But, all these advantages will be neutralised unless Famagousta shall represent the power of England like Malta and Gibraltar. The more minutely that we scrutinise the question of a Cyprian occupation, the more prominent