

Pachas, Governors, and various functionaries, who, from the highest to the lowest official, mainly exist upon extortion.

It is hardly necessary to explain that British assistance in such a form will be most unwelcome, and will increase our reputation for intermeddling while in the hour of extremity we withhold the required aid. Any interference on our part with the administration of Asia Minor will cause an extreme jealousy and suspicion throughout all classes of Turkish officials, who will be rendered the more amenable to the guiles of Russian intrigues from Kars and Ardahan. A very slight knowledge of Turkish character would induce the natural conclusion. The English would be suspected of coveting Asia Minor, as they had already obtained Cyprus, and Russia would have gained her end in destroying all confidence that might possibly have existed, and thus endanger the defensive alliance.

There are serious risks that might enforce the advance of Russian troops beyond the defined frontier. Already there are reports of general discontent and threatened disturbances. In the event of a mutiny of Turkish troops on the Russian border, the Russians might be invited to assist by the Pacha in command. Sometimes such revolts are factitious, for political purposes. In all cases the position of Russia in Asia Minor is one of extreme danger to Turkey, and it is far from improbable that activity on her side, and passiveness upon ours, may terminate in a friendship between the Russians and the Turks to the detriment of British interests, and to the confusion of the assumed Protectorate. This document distinctly states :—

If “ Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any further attempt