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confusion, and to learn the enemy's strength, but neither the Lieutenant nor the Coadjutor wonld have it so, saving in support of their decision that they could not have prevented the landing because their force of infantry and cavalry was so small, and that it was wrong to risk what they had, and to prejudice the defence of the fortresses, to retire to which was a matter of nearly thirty miles: if this had been four or even ten miles it would have been worth making the attempt. And this opinion prevailed because his lordship affirmed that .Signor Sforza Pallavicino used to say the same thing, and because the Lieutenant willed it so. Nevertheless the rest of the nobility of Nicosia, with the exception of the Count of Roccas and his brothers, presented a most spirited letter, saying they were ready and desirons with Signor Astorre Baglione to march to the Salines, and to try every means of preventing the landing, or at least as far as they could to threw into disorder and injnre the enemy. A good witness to this is Signor Astorre, who told the whole truth abont this letter at Famagosta in the presence of Sr. Niccolo Donato, chief officer, on hoaitl his own galley. So the stradiot cavalry which was with the Count of Roceas at the Salines retired to Nicosia as soon as the fleet arrived before the Salines, and remained in that city until the end. Part of the army without artillery appeared in the environs of Nicosia on July 20, and at once Colonel Palazzo da Fano advised and wished to make a sally with all the stradiot horse, the cavalry, the newly raised infantry, and part of the Italian and Greek foot soldiers, and to charge that wing of the enemy before the rest arrived (it came up next day with the artillery), showing that there was reasonable hope of effecting some signal success. Neither the Lientenant and his Council nor the Coadjntor would consent, although among ourselves the said Colonel was esteemed as an officer experienced in war and completely trustworthy. The enemy's forces were now all united, and their camp pitched without any resistance on our part. Five hundred horsemen only were despatched from tho Salines to Famagosta, to keep that city strictly invested, and also to cut ns off freni all help which might reach ns therefrom. They camped then with their tents on the open country, and on the hills of Mandia, where stood the pavilion of the Pasha commanding the expedition. They dug on the spot a well in which contrary to the general opinion they found an infinite supply of water. A great part of the army, and specially of the cavalry, was posted at S. Clemente, where is the spring which supplies the citadel, and there were tents also in the villages Galangia and Acalassa, five Italian miles away, for the convenience of the infantry which had halted there. The first thing the Turks did as soon as they were united and settled in camp was to come round Nicosia on horseback to provoke ns to sally out and skirmish. But the Coadjutor and the Council would never allow us or the nobles (who were most eager to do so too, and were even by speeches and spirited letters showing that they wanted to meet the enemy) to leave the city; except once only, when Captain Cortese, a stradiot, was taken and killed. When the Turks perceived that we did not intend to come out into the plain they began to devote their time to the making of forts. The first was bnilt on the hill of Santa Marina, at a distance of 270 paces from the Podecattero bastion: it was finished with very great speed, and little resistance on our side, although from the curtain between the Podecattero and Caraffa bastions, and from the front of the bastion we fired with pieees of eighty to prevent its construction : but they built it by night, and we could not hinder them. From this fort they kept battering the houses, and part of the platforms of the curtains, but with no great damage to our soldiers. They built their second fort at S. Giorgio di Magniana, and from this they battered in like manner onr houses, and forced ns to withdraw our defences, but it was of little service to them to destroy the houses outside. The third was «2 EXCERPTA CYPRIA.

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