

to return all from whence they came; were it either, for that they considered their forces better, or for the nearness of the danger, being much troubled at the suddain news, that above 300 sail (for so it was reported) were already upon the shore; or for that they thought it was too late, and would be to no purpose to do what they formerly had resolved, the enemy being already arrived, and having begun to land their men. So all things were left free and safe to the Turks, to their no little wonder; for they began at first to suspect that this easy entrance into the enemy's country did not proceed from any weakness, negligence or cowardice of the defendants, but that it might be done out of some design, or military stratagem, to draw them unawares into some snare. They therefore knew not at first what to do, and proceeded with much caution; but having over run many parts and done much prejudice, not meeting with any resistance, they grew more bold; they did not only advance with their whole camp, but roved up and down everywhere whithersoever their desire of pillage or any other thing drew them, without any order or colours.

But the Commanders, that they might lose no more time in vain, began to think upon drawing near one of the two chiefest Forts of the Kingdom. Piali was for expugning Famagosta first, hoping to get it within a few days, which being lost, he said, that Nicossia must likewise necessarily fall soon into their hands; for that being full of unnecessary people, far from the seashore, in midst of a Campagna, beset by so many enemies, it would not be able to be relieved, without which it could not long hold out. That Famagosta was a little and a weak Fort, and so defective as it would not be able to withstand the first battery; nor were the defendants so many, or so valiant, as that they durst expect the assault of so brave an army, whose reputation would be so much encreased by that victory, as all things would become easy which might as yet peradventure be thought difficult. Nay, this sole example infusing terror into all the inhabitants would be sufficient to put them soon and with little trouble, in possession of the whole kingdom. But Mustafâ affirmed on the contrary that the reputation of so great forces ought not to be lessened by falling upon petty enterprises, whereby to enconrage the enemy and to dishearten their own men. That Famagosta was possessed by the Genueeses for the space of 90 years, and yet the Lusignan Kings were masters of the Island at the same time. So as it might be conceived, the taking of that city would not make much towards the getting of the whole kingdom; whereas the whole nobility were withdrawn into Nicossia, and most of the people, wealth and ammunition of the island, so as one labour might do the whole business. That the alterations which are often seen to fall out in a short time when great actions are in hand, are not to be foreseen: nor was it certain that Famagosta would be so soon taken, but that they should rather be necessitated to imploy those forces elsewhere, according as the Christian Fleet should divert them: so as if they should depart from the island, and leave the enemy masters of almost all the whole kingdom, they should get but little good by such an enterprise. He further added, that the air about Famagosta was very bad, the town being seated low amongst marish grounds, and that therefore it would be unsupportable to those that were not long accustomed thereunto; that therefore they were not to carry their soldiers where they were likely to perish of sickness, but where they might give proof of their valour: that to die without praise or merit was common; that no worthy valiant man could fear the greatest dangers of war, or of the enemy's forces, when they were accompanied with the hopes of glory. Moreover, that they had learnt by such prisoners as they had taken, that the men of chiefest authority, and best experienced souldiers, were withdrawn into Famagosta, wherein the true defence of cities lay; not in walls nor bulworks, when every man's valour is to be tryed in assaults; the skill and worth of his souldiers being much better, as was known by experience, in taking